Posts Tagged ‘non-proliferation’

Talks About Talks: International Division

Friday, May 28th, 2010

Going nowhere, and it’s not a surprise: the non-proliferation treaty talks!

Same old problem: Arab states want a final statement that “names and shames” Israel, US won’t allow it.

Same old solution: A fudgcicle, trading a 2012 conference to talk about talks on a WMD-free Middle East for Israel’s commitment to attend such a conference.

Same old double standard: The US will not push Israel in any way to change its views, either on peace talks or non-proliferation talks, hence even talks about talks are a waste of time.

Gorilla says: “Diplomacy only works when national interests coincide at the intersection of Realism and Hypocrisy!”

Update (Friday 4pm): A deal has been reached which urges the Israels to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and put their nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection. Whether Syria or Iran will accept this remains to be seen, but the US at least is moving slightly forward.

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The Proliferation Of Bribery

Friday, May 14th, 2010

How to reduce nuclear weapons?

Spend more on them!

Yes, it’s the usual Washington idiocy.

Talk about a nuclear free world.

Get Nobel Prize.

Negotiate a treaty with Russia to reduce weaponry by 30% (why not 90%, which would be more than sufficiently deterrent?).

Bribe the Senate to pass the treaty with $80 billion in “upgrades” for the remaining weaponry, which presumably means you’re not intending to give it up.

Gorilla says: “Proliferation is the new non-proliferation!”

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The Copenhagen Syndrome

Monday, May 3rd, 2010

Today’s Middle East non-starter: the elimination of nuclear weapons from the region!

Given that only Israel has nuclear weapons at present, and has shown zero interest in either conventional peace talks or giving up WMD, it’s difficult to understand what anyone expects to accomplish at yet another non-proliferation conference.

In many way, the Copenhagen Syndrome of these surreal efforts comes down to this:

1) As in Copenhagen with climate change, the US isn’t really serious about non-proliferation. If we were, then we’d be compelling India, Pakistan, and Israel to join the IAEA inspections regime, and allowing inspectors to have a look at our own arsenal.

2) The US isn’t about to put any pressure on Israel in an election year, or frankly in any year. There’s zero domestic political gain in taking the Israelis on, whether in “talks about talks” or in “talks about talks about treaties”.

3) Deterrence has a very fungible definition. Applied to “great powers”, it means having enough destructive power to convince one’s enemies not to attack. Applied to the Middle East, it means keeping one friendly power nuclear and hoping no one else anywhere in the region either notices or responds.

Gorilla says: “Hard to be hostile to your captors when you’re the one who arranged the kidnapping!”

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This Week’s George T. Platter And Bait

Thursday, April 8th, 2010

The tidetime folklorist wonders when non-proliferation will mean the opposite of what it means today.

The Platter: The Sherrys Put Your Arms Around Me (Don’t inspect, just respect!)

The Bait: Trophy Teasers Bait Bomb Pack (The Arsenal of Hypocrisy)

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Why Are We Afraid Of Iran?

Monday, July 6th, 2009

Gorilla is still not clear what precisely we have to fear from Iran.

It seems inevitable that Iran will develop a civilian nuclear capability and that this capability could lead to the production of nuclear weapons.

While we intend to negotiate with Iran to convince them or bribe them or otherwise cajole them not to do this, in reality we have very little leverage, short of military force or a sudden and radical shift in the Iranian interest calculus, to make this happen.

An American attack on Iran, directly or by proxy, could be disastrous.  A regional war might well ensue, leading to the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used if Israel, which certainly has them, decided its existence was at stake.

On the other hand, so long as we aren’t directly involved, a regional war could be a good thing.

Non-proliferation is a noble goal, but our hypocrisy on the question makes it essentially a non-starter. We don’t allow international inspections of our nuclear forces, neither does Israel, neither does India, neither does Pakistan, neither does Russia, neither does China.

It seems unlikely that Iran will ever agree to such inspections unless we do or unless they believe there’s more to be had by allowing inspections to go forward.

Our approach seems to be “if you’re a sensible, stable government, no matter how repressive, we think it’ll be ok for you to have nuclear weapons”.

On the other hand, “if you’re a government led by a reclusive nut job or a group of medieval mullahs, you can’t be in our club”.

What then might work? Ironically, nuclear proliferation is the only sensible national security policy.

It’s far better for Iran and the United States to have nuclear weapons than it is for us to allow the Israelis to attack Iran or spend another fruitless year on negotiating with Iran (or negotiating with the Russians about Iran).

If Iran does develop nuclear weapons, it’s likely that everyone else in the region will be hankering for them, and we can’t do much about that other than decide, as we did with India, to make a buck on it.

The mullahs may be nutty, but it’s unlikely they’ll risk national annihilation by using nuclear weapons.

If Iran does decide to fire away, America will finally have an oil price that makes alternative energy economically viable.

We can at last treat the Middle East in the same way we’ve always treated Africa.

Of course, if everyone who has the cash or the science can proliferate, we might have more to worry about than what some fifth-rate nation like Iran might do.

And then we might grow up.

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